The political responsibility of bystanders: the case of Mali

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(Received 20 July 2013; accepted 31 August 2013)

It has been a commonplace since the 2012 coup to hear how fragile the Malian democracy had become. Among the many causes is the political role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played as a fourth branch of government. As deliberative democratic processes were replaced by a corrupt elite consensus during the past eight years, NGOs assumed an important place in this system. This included humanitarian NGOs. However, these same NGOs until recently were blind to the political impact they were having. This essay suggests one explanation for this blindness and argues for the importance of a conception of humanitarian aid that balances moral responsibility with political responsibility.

Keywords: non-governmental organizations; humanitarian aid; political responsibility; bystanders; Mali

There is currently a lively, often very heated debate over the wisdom of foreign aid as an engine of sustainable development in poor countries (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). In Mali, up until the coup d’état on 22 March 2012, the economy was heavily dependent upon foreign aid, with the four largest donors – the World Bank, France, the European Union, and the USA – contributing roughly half of Mali’s annual budget. According to van de Walle, ‘compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, Mali has tended to receive more aid, both in per capita terms, and as a share of its economy’ (2012, 4). One question that this level of aid dependency has raised, beyond its impact on the Malian economy, is the political danger it poses for a fragile democracy such as Mali.

van de Walle’s view is that while foreign aid that has gone to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Mali has provided some Malians with ‘significant professional experience’, there are serious political dangers. One of these is the decline in the role of the legislature in governance as executive branch–donor relationships become insulated from legislative dialogue and debate (van de Walle, 2012, 7). It is this short-circuiting of democratic politics in Mali, not the more common forms of payoffs and bribes (see Rousselier 2013), that I wish to reflect upon and that van de Walle and others have written about before more generally (Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle 2006). I will call this danger institutional political corruption.

While some donors and recipients of foreign aid may be guilty of taking advantage of this system of development aid in immoral and illegal ways, I am interested in the forward-looking political responsibilities of humanitarian NGOs to remedy institutional political corruption. I will argue that both domestic and international humanitarian NGOs in Mali have benefited from this institutional political corruption and are therefore politically responsible for remediying it. In Mali specifically, institutional political corruption has included the hollowing out of a promising process of constitutional dialogue and debate. This local and regional process of democratic deliberation was initiated by the first president of Mali’s Third Republic, Alpha

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Oumar Konaré (Wing 2008). However, his successor, Amadou Toumani Touré (popularly known as ATT), replaced this emerging decentralized system with a process of consensus formation among political and economic elites (Wing 2013).

It is a commonplace since the 2012 coup to hear how fragile the Malian democracy had become. However, few commentators and multilateral organizations saw the collapse coming, and certainly not the major donors and their beneficiaries. What explains this blindness? I want to suggest one explanation which I will call, following Vaclav Havel, ‘the illusion of mutual indifference’. It is a form of blindness to which humanitarian NGOs are particularly susceptible in their role as bystanders to severe violence.

When we think of bystanders, we typically think of individuals who, out of fear or apathy, fail to meet their moral responsibility to come to the aid of others in distress (see e.g. Singer 2009). Humanitarian NGOs typically do meet this moral responsibility to rescue, and in fact, they often put themselves at risk for the sake of others. Paradoxically, it is their humanitarian success that has the potential of leading to institutional political corruption. Without being morally guilty or legally culpable, they still can be politically responsible as bystanders who benefit from this process of institutional political corruption.

I begin with a brief review of the political situation in Mali. Then, I apply the concepts of blindness, bystanders, and political responsibility to better understand the recent events in Mali, once thought of as a shining example of a poor but democratic country moving slowly toward empowerment and sustainable growth on its own terms. I conclude with some suggestions for how this democratic process can be renewed.¹

**Politics**

Until the recent coup d’état, most foreign observers still considered Mali a model of relatively peaceful development, despite the ill effects of structural adjustment policies and other multilateral and international pressures (Poage 2008, 118–123). Since then, a new narrative is being written. An article by eight scholars with an intimate knowledge of Malian history and culture begins with this statement: ‘In 2012, the political landscape in the Republic of Mali transformed rapidly, drastically, and unpredictably’ (Leccoq et al. 2013). Thirty years after its independence from France and 20 years after the creation of a formally democratic government, the Republic of Mali seemingly fell apart overnight. The actual process of institutional political corruption has been more gradual.

The frontline actors who contributed to ATT’s overthrow and the collapse of political order in the North are well known. Lower ranking, disgruntled officers in the Malian army triggered the collapse when they took over the Presidential palace from ATT with very little resistance. This emboldened an already aggressive group of separatists in the North and their new allies, a mixed group of jihadists, some of whom had returned to Mali after the fall of Qaddafi in Libya and others coming to Mali from elsewhere to establish an Al-Qaeda stronghold in the region.

In the face of these separatists and jihadists what remained of the Malian army in the North quickly dissolved, some going south toward the capital city Bamako and other fleeing to nearby Niger. Over the next year, with little to no resistance from the Malian army, the jihadists pushed the separatists aside and took control of the major cities in the North, establishing strict Shariah law and terrorizing many civilian populations (Mali: Five Months of Crisis 2012). By early January 2013, the jihadists were beginning to move toward the city of Mopti in central Mali, apparently with plans to take over Bamako farther south.

After sporadic international protests against the unlawful overthrow of the Malian government and human rights violations throughout northern Mali, France intervened militarily with the help of African Union troops, pushed the jihadists back, and reclaimed the northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The separatists were grateful for this intervention but unwilling to give up their claims to a new state of Azawad in the North. More African regional forces under United Nations auspices joined the French, and the jihadists melted further back into remote areas in the North, occasionally engaging in isolated acts of terror. At the same time some separatists refused to cooperate with the Malian army, especially in Kidal.

During this one-year period over 400,000 Malians fled their homes in the North, some going to nearby countries as refugees and others moving south in Mali to become internally displaced persons. Many of the humanitarian aid programs administered by multilateral organizations and NGOs suspended their activities in Mali, leading to additional hardship and suffering. Mining, farming, and tourism declined, and the already weak Malian economy, which had endured a difficult drought in 2011, was sent reeling. On the other hand, drugs, arms, and human trafficking, including the use of child soldiers, continued to fund the remaining separatists and jihadists groups (Baptiste-Salomon 2013).

After difficult negotiations, a truce accord between representatives of the interim Malian government and separatist leaders was signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on 18 June 2013, allowing the Malian army to return to Kidal in order to provide security in the North during anticipated national presidential elections. However, there was still quite a bit of friction between the interim Malian government and the main group negotiating for a separate state in the North, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Many observers were skeptical that new elections could be held as early as July. They felt that elections should wait until identity cards were distributed more widely and a more detailed agreement was made with factions in the North to curb illegal activity and settle the question of secession (International Crisis Group 2013). A National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation was formed by the interim national government, but it remained mostly inactive. However, the promise of $4 billion in foreign aid, which had been held up since the coup, and the desire by most Malians to restore their ‘dignity’ kept the presidential elections on track for late July and resulted in relatively higher voter turnouts and relatively lower charges of voter fraud in the two rounds of the election.

On 11 August 2013 former prime minister (and former NGO leader) Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected the new President, eliciting a collective sigh of relief. His agenda is clear. More meetings with separatists will have to be held to settle the details of an agreement for relative autonomy. These have begun, albeit with difficulty.² Government ministries will have to be cleansed of bribery and extortion. The army will have to be trained. And the aid will flow again. Whether the renewal of humanitarian foreign aid will only exacerbate the institutional political problems that contributed to the collapse in the first place will depend upon how broadly based and long term the process of dialogue and reconciliation will be and also how mindful the NGO recipients of this aid are of its political consequences.

**Bystanders**

Situations like the one that Malians have found themselves in for the past two years are often analyzed through a lens of victims and perpetrators. Who is to blame for the violence and political chaos? Who has suffered? These are key questions, but they run the risk of ignoring the large swath of bystanders who are also an important part of the story. Without the presence of bystanders – in both passive and active roles – the wheels of violence and injustice cannot turn. This is most obvious in situations involving overt geographical displacement and ethnic cleansing (Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011). Without bystanders, victims cannot be resettled and their lands put to new uses. It is also true in less overt ways in which political power is
remain dependent, only now they are dependent upon NGOs that are rarely accountable to them and a corrupt state that is parasitic on these NGOs and their donors.

**Blindness**

More specifically, it is a matter of repressive justice. This is not primarily a matter of paying monetary reparations or repairing damaged psyches (see e.g. Barkun 2000; Elster 2004; Walker 2000). Official public apologies may be a necessary precondition for constructive dialogue and reconciliation to repair the political order (see Nobles 2008), and money may have to be spent, but the main idea is that repressive justice requires that the process of political dialogue and reconciliation be re-established on a sustainable footing. Reparative justice, as I use the term, is a democratic political ideal.

One obstacle to repressive justice is that the benefits that political bystanders as a group enjoy are often opaque to them as members of their group. They have not acted merely as individuals, and so they may not experience the reactive attitude or feeling of personal guilt that persons acting solely on their own might. The absence of such tell-tale reactive attitudes or feelings does not mean that they have not been part of a collectivity that has benefited from institutional political corruption. They may well deny their individual responsibility or guilt, but without their involvement, complex coordinated activities, including the undermining of democratic political institutions, cannot be carried out. As Kelly has said, ‘Accepting indirect benefits such as financial advantage, status advantage, or political power may establish the complicity of individuals with a group’s actions they do not intend or foresee, even when their participation is marginal’ (2011, 208).

Individual bystanders may sometimes stand on balconies and appear to watch indifferently as their neighbors are shipped off to extermination camps. They may occasionally turn to see a freight car rolling by as they harvest the wheat they then sell to the baker who supplies a cruel occupying army with its food. However, more importantly their benefits are not just morally tainted; they are politically valuable. As shareholders in commercial enterprises that employ slave labor (see e.g. Blackmon 2008) or as investors in financial institutions that retain the ‘dormant accounts’ of past victims of severe violence (see e.g. Levin 1999), they acquire political power as well as social and economic capital, sometimes with little or no knowledge of the harm that has been done. In such cases, they have a political responsibility now and into the future to repair the damage that has been done to those who have been displaced, enslaved, robbed, or otherwise disenfranchised and their progeny, even if they have not contributed individually to these forms of violence. As audacious as it may sound, the same is true for many humanitarian NGOs. They benefit from the very situations that they are striving to remedy, but do not see their political responsibility to repair the institutional political corruption that they have contributed to and benefited from. We can see this blindness more clearly through a brief comparison between collaborators and the type of bystander I have been describing.

Mary Fulbrook has argued that in the case of those collaborators she calls ‘facilitators’ of genocide, such as the civilian administrator Udo Klausa in Nazi-occupied Poland during World War II, we should set aside his mixed, unconvincing accounts of his knowledge of and role in the Holocaust, and instead focus on the way the organized and dynamic structures of power operate on such participants:

This dissociation between inner belief and outer behavior allowed many people to enjoy a sense of retaining their inner decency while at the same time not risking any loss of livelihood, any compromise over career ambitions, let alone any potentially more serious sanctions; hence never revealing any sign of disagreement or openly showing anything less than apparently full commitment to the regime and its policies. (Fulbrook 2012, 67–68)
This 'disassociation' may be true for collaborators such as Klaus, but is not how bystanders rationalize their role as beneficiaries. The political responsibility of bystanders occurs at a distance, their benefits are more remote, and their false consciousness is an illusion that their relationship to other bystanders has been inconsequential, not a self-serving denial of violence they may have had a hand in.

In other words, the key element in the thoughts of bystanders is not their indifference toward violence, but the illusions they have about the effects of their indifference toward fellow bystanders. Their attitude of indifference toward one another misleads them about the operations of political power in which they play a crucial role. Vaclav Havel has called this blindness the 'illusion of mutual indifference' (Havel 1986). Bystanders recognize the existence of severe violence, but they do not recognize that their indifference encourages other bystanders to act indifferently, thereby strengthening the hand of the perpetrators.

Metaphysically speaking, without the greengrocer's slogan the office worker's slogan could not exist, and vice versa. Each proposes to the other that something be repeated and each accepts the other's proposal. Their mutual indifference to each other's slogan is only an illusion: in reality, by exhibiting their slogans, each compels the other to accept the rules of the game, and to confirm thereby the power that requires the slogans in the first place. Quite simply, each helps the other to be obedient. Both are objects in a system of control, but at the same time they are its subjects as well. They are both victims of the system and its instruments. (Havel 1986, 51–52)

The unspoken agreement Havel emphasizes is an agreement to acquiesce to a political language of deception. In Czechoslovakia this took the form of small signs such as 'Workers of the world unite!' routinely displayed in store windows. However cynical these expressions of solidarity may have been, they nonetheless conveyed the message that there was no alternative to the authoritarian status quo, however hollow its promise of worldwide liberation.

The contract of mutual indifference between greengrocers and office workers legitimated existing power. The more signs the greengrocer and office worker put up, the stronger was the bond between everyday bystanders and the greater the power of the state. They may have thought that their window signs were trivially false. In fact, these instruments of their own making perpetuated their acquiescence as disenfranchised minor beneficiaries of state power. The illusion is not that workers of the world will never unite, but rather that they think that by posting such empty promises in this perfunctory way they do not encourage others to do the same. Havel described this condition of illusory mutual indifference as 'living within a lie'. The greengrocer and office worker did not believe deeply in the slogans they 'compelled' one another to repeat, but they failed to realize the cumulative political effect of their mutual indifference toward these slogans (Havel 1986, 45). Their Malian humanitarian counterparts forge new bonds among themselves and leave their clients detached and adrift in a sea of fragmentary political connections, both legal and illegal.

Political responsibility

My argument calls into question the work of many individuals who devote themselves to humanitarian development programs in countries like Mali with weak or failing states. One might think that the people in the countries that need NGOs the most. Where a state cannot provide justice for its citizens, Onora O'Neill has argued, there should be opportunities for transnational corporations and NGOs to step in. 'Where non-state actors can contribute to justice, fundamental obligations that in other circumstances are secured by compliance with state requirements demand that they do so' (O'Neill 2004, 258). O'Neill calls this 'opportunist realism', but the problem with it is that it is not altogether realistic. In the case of a weak state such as Mali that scores so low on the United Nations Human Development Index, the idea that NGOs can fill in for the state ignores the distrust within civil society among competing ethnic and other political groups for very scarce resources. Expecting humanitarian NGOs to resolve disputes over the distribution and redistribution of the social and economic goods, in the absence of a legitimate political authority, may only put humanitarian workers at greater risks. NGOs may be effective in lobbying against an intransient government ministry, but they are neither trained nor equipped to serve as a surrogate ministry with mechanisms for popular participation and the means to safeguard against state tyranny and corporate abuse of power.

In sum, NGOs have a negative political responsibility not to weaken already weak democratic political institutions but also a positive responsibility to create a stronger demand for good governance where it is lacking and a practical understanding of it where it emerges. In fact, this is a stated priority of many government foreign aid and development programs that work with NGOs who recognize the need for good governance as a condition for effective short- and long-term humanitarian development programs. These NGOs are aware of their political as well as their moral responsibilities.

However, the illusion of mutual indifference of some NGOs makes a two-track approach that distinguishes political from moral responsibility very difficult. Some faith-based programs such as those involved in international adoption behave in neither a politically nor a morally responsible manner (Joyce 2013). But even NGOs who are more morally scrupulous may suffer from a form of political blindness. The more they immerse themselves in their humanitarian mission, the more they lose sight of the deleterious cumulative effects they have on political knowledge, motivation, and trust. The services they provide to needy women and children may have a cumulative political effect on themselves and other NGOs: they may have a difficult time seeing beyond the immediate material good they may do for their clients to the corrupting institutional political consequences accompanying the political benefits they enjoy. The challenge for NGOs is to avoid this illusion while still meeting their urgent humanitarian responsibility for the people they serve.

A practical difficulty when trying to meet this challenge is that many desperately needy people, not just bystander beneficiaries, may become much worse off if NGOs such as Oxfam, CARE, and Save the Children play a more limited role in humanitarian intervention in order to avoid short-circuiting fragile democratic political processes. Some NGOs, including Oxfam, are well aware of the need for more balance between humanitarian assistance and political empowerment, that is, balance that neither neglects the needy nor undermines their democratic capabilities. In a long 'Briefing Note' on 15 May 2013, Oxfam reviewed its policies in Mali after the 2012 coup and made it clear that a 'new development contract' was needed between humanitarian international NGOs like itself, citizens, government ministries, and national and lateral institutions. Rather than see clear of politics and the danger of being branded a pawn of Western counter-terrorism policies, Oxfam recognizes that it must facilitate a 'new development contract' that brings opposing parties together to achieve 'reconciliation and peace building' alongside socio-economic development. 'Oxfam is working to establish a more integrated approach to conflict within its programming to both minimize the risks and also to gradually develop programmes that can have a positive, transformative impact on conflict'.

This two-track approach is not peculiar to Oxfam. It is becoming the industry standard. The 2010 Guide to Accountability and Quality Management published by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership states its commitment to local participation in similar terms:

An organisation should seek the informed consent of those people it is privileged to be in a position to help. Participation is the process through which people who are affected by conditions of poverty are able to exercise their right to informed consent. The concepts of participation and empowerment are closely related. Empowerment is sometimes described as the ability to make choices, but it must also include the ability to shape the choices on offer. Empowerment does not necessarily mean reversing existing
realities, for example challenging power hierarchies or disempowering organisations. It is about enabling people affected by crises to make their own choices, to speak out on their own behalf, and to control their own lives. Participation and informed consent are key processes in achieving this. (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2013, 58)

‘Informed consent’ and ‘doing no harm’ are not enough. Humanitarian NGOs should facilitate citizen participation in shaping agendas and determining alternatives to which consent can be given or withheld. Furthermore, as Jay Drydyk argues, empowerment must be ‘durable’ (Drydyk 2008, 231–245). One-off encounters, no matter how successful, do not make an effective dialogue toward reconciliation.

Efforts pursuant to the Oxfam briefing and the HAP Guide have recently begun in Mali. For example, International Medical Corps, a member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, has been doing emergency relief work in northern Mali on the basis of the HAP Guide since the retreat of the jihadist.11 On the other side of the equation, through the leadership of the international NGO Interpeace which has done similar work in other post-conflict situations, efforts have begun to build a long-term dialogue and reconciliation process throughout Mali.12 Unlike official truth and reconciliation commissions, Interpeace works from the bottom-up to map out political conflicts through the eyes of the competing domestic and diasporic parties themselves and then bring local groups together to address the concrete problems they face. Instead of starting with the biggest, most intractable issue (in Mali’s case this might be relative political autonomy for the North) and laying that before a country-wide commission, they work to cultivate a habit of dialogue and reconciliation over smaller issues such as local land tenure disputes.

I began this essay critical of bystanders who neglect their political responsibilities. This problem is more tangible when talking about those who opportunistically acquire property and other assets in the context of severe violence and turn these material assets into political power. It is much more difficult to accept this as a criticism of humanitarian NGOs in a country such as Mali. Humanitarian NGOs, both domestic and international, are hardly a homogeneous lot, and the benefits that accrue to them are not as blatant as those enjoyed by development NGOs in other post-conflict situations. However, as long as NGOs are indifferent to the collective benefits they enjoy as a de facto fourth branch of government, the more unlikely are the prospects for constructive dialogue and long-term democratic reconciliation in Mali. By focusing only on their moral responsibilities for humanitarian assistance, NGOs make empowerment, democratic dialogue, reconciliation, and ultimately the effectiveness of their own humanitarian assistance less likely.

This does not mean that humanitarian assistance, anymore than development aid, in the abstract is necessarily anti-political or de-politicizing (Ferguson 1994). This can and has happened, but by focusing on the actual work of humanitarian NGOs we are able to see what the blind spots have been and how political responsibilities can be met in a more democratic way.13

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Michael Bratton, Jay Drydyk, John Staatz, Bruce Whitehouse, and the editors of the Journal of Global Ethics for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay. I am grateful to Nango Dembbe, Maria Diarra, and Yobo Guindo for their insights into Malian politics and the work of NGOs in Mali. Finally, I wish to thank Eric Palmer, Fred Gifford, and the participants in the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Development Ethics: Questions, Challenges, and Responsibilities at Michigan State University. 6 August 2013 for the opportunity to present the ideas in this essay to them and for their critical discussion of it.

Notes

1. For a concise summary of the geo-political strategic situation in Mali, see Boukhars (2013; alternatively, Hayer 2013).
2. On the harmful effects of structural adjustment policies in general, see Aboubahar and Cinigrenelli (2007). For a description of the economic and social situation in Mali just prior to the 2012 coup, see Mills and MacNamara (2011).
4. Kelly’s notion of reparative justice also stresses collective responsibilities that fall short of legal culpability and individual moral responsibility. Reparative obligations are owed, she argues, even when [the contributions of individual members may have been marginal and causally ineffectual and have come from seemingly innocuous motives. These factors may well be taken to mitigate the blame individual members deserve, but they do not necessarily undermine the case for reparative obligations that could bind all participants. (Kelly 2011, 195–196)
6. Uvin has made a similar argument about the ‘blindness’ of NGOs in Rwanda whose foreign professionals do not see how they benefit materially and disproportionately from their work compared to the native Rwandans they were there to assist (1998, 141–160). I am indebted to Bruce Whitehouse for this reference.
7. One hundred and eighty-two out of 185 countries in 2012 were ranked according to the Human Development Index in the 2013 UN Development Report (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Statistics.pdf).
8. For example, see the Socourari Women’s Literacy Center in Mali funded by World Conquest (2013) and the A Child For All (ACFA) children’s project in Mali (2013). Both of these NGO programs provide services to the needy with little administrative overhead. Whether morally responsible NGOs such as these recognize the danger of institutional political corruption is, of course, an open question.
9. I am grateful to Michael Bratton for this formulation of this objection. For an international NGO that claims to be committed to emergency humanitarian assistance and empowerment, see the website of the NGO Mercy Corps (2013).
11. I am grateful to Dennis Walto of International Medical Corps (2013) for describing their work in Mali for me.
12. I am grateful to Jerry McCann of Interpeace (2013) for describing their work in Mali for me.
13. See Kurawa (2007) for a similar emphasis on the ‘work of global justice’.

Notes on contributor

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